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Insurance
by Bradley S. Wolff*
Maren R. Cave**
and Thomas D. Martin***
I. INTRODUCTION
During this survey period, the courts in Georgia seemed to take a
respite from the usual litany of automobile and uninsured motorist
(UM) cases, the summaries of which typically populate this annual
update. Instead, the courts seemed to focus more on liability insurance
issues, rendering many decisions on well-known principles of law and a
few important decisions concerning offers of settlement, counteroffers,
notice, and the use of intervention in coverage disputes. Particularly
noteworthy were two cases involving offers of settlement, one where an
offer was deemed inadequate as a time-limited demand and another
where acceptance of an offer was deemed inadequate where a proffered
release proposed different settlement terms.
In the automobile arena, only one UM decision and one commercial
trucking decision involved previously undecided issues. In the former,
the Georgia Court of Appeals held that an automobile policy may
provide UM coverage for a designated group of insureds and no
coverage for others. In the latter, the United States Court of Appeals for
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the Eleventh Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, held that an umbrella
policy issued to cover the owner of a trailer also provided coverage to
the driver of the truck who allegedly caused the collision as well as to
the driver’s employer.
In the property arena, the survey period found both state and federal
decisions on first-party issues like non-cooperation, judicial estoppel,
valued policy law, diminished value, and principles relating to the
proper construction of policy terms. While only a few of the property
cases included in this survey have precedential value, the other cases
were included because they reflect trends, arguments, or issues that
practitioners may consider unique or important in the property
insurance arena.1
II. AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CASES
A. “Tiered” Uninsured Motorist Coverage Permissible
In Jones v. Federated Mutual Insurance Co.,2 the Georgia Court of
Appeals held that an automobile insurer may provide UM coverage to
only a certain group of insureds and exclude such coverage for all others
with the written election of the named insured.3 A husband and wife
were test-driving a new vehicle owned by Five Star Automotive Group
and insured by Federated Mutual Insurance Co. (Federated Mutual)
when the vehicle was rear-ended. The couple brought suit against the
at-fault driver and accepted the liability limits from his insurer.
However, the couple did not have personal automobile insurance and
sought to recover UM benefits from Federated Mutual. The Federated
Mutual policy explicitly limited UM benefits to directors, officers, and
owners of Five Star and their family members.4 Five Star rejected, in
writing, UM coverage for “any other person who qualifies as an
insured.”5 Federated Mutual was granted summary judgment on the
ground that the couple was not within the designated group afforded
UM benefits under the policy.6

1. For an analysis of insurance law during the prior survey period, see Thomas D.
Martin, Bradley S. Wolff & Maren R. Cave, Insurance, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 70
MERCER L. REV. 111 (2018).
2. 346 Ga. App. 237, 816 S.E.2d 105 (2018).
3. Id. at 244, 816 S.E.2d at 111.
4. Id. at 237–38, 816 S.E.2d at 106–07.
5. Id. at 238, 816 S.E.2d at 107.
6. Id. at 238, 816 S.E.2d at 108.
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On appeal, the Joneses argued that they were “insureds” within the
definition provided by O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11,7 and the statute required UM
coverage for all insureds unless it is rejected entirely by a named
insured.8 The court rejected this argument, holding that the UM statute
did not impose an “all or nothing” restriction on insurers and insureds. 9
Rather, relying on Crouch v. Federated Mutual Insurance Co.,10 the
court stated that the UM statute protected an insured’s right to
contract for “tiered” coverage.11 In Crouch, the court held that a policy
which provided high UM limits to a car dealership’s owner, officers, and
directors, but lower limits for all other “insureds,” did not run afoul of
the statute or public policy: “[a]s long as the mandatory UM minimum
is met and optional UM coverage is offered pursuant to statutory
requirements, a ‘combination[] of sublimits and interests restricted to
named insureds and resident relatives’ contravenes neither the law nor
public policy.”12
In Jones, the court extended the rule established by Crouch to allow
an insurer, with the insured’s written permission, to exclude UM
coverage altogether for persons other than a designated group of
covered persons.13 Although Crouch and Jones involved commercial
insureds, neither case distinguished between personal and commercial
policies. Therefore, it appears the court of appeals would also determine
that a personal automobile or umbrella policy, which excluded from UM
coverage all persons other than the named insured, a spouse, and
resident relatives, was enforceable.
B. Tractor-Trailer Accidents Involve Both Units of the Vehicle
Where an umbrella policy is issued to cover liability arising from the
use of a commercial trailer, does the coverage extend to accidents
caused by the driver of a truck pulling the trailer as a matter of law? In
Great American Insurance Co. v. Moore Freight Service, Inc.,14 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the
truck driver and his employer were entitled to coverage even though the
umbrella policy was limited solely to the trailer, and the trailer

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11 (2019).
Jones, 346 Ga. App. at 240, 816 S.E.2d at 108.
Id. at 241, 816 S.E.2d at 109.
257 Ga. App. 604, 571 S.E.2d 574 (2002).
Jones, 346 Ga. App. at 241, 816 S.E.2d at 109.
Crouch, 257 Ga. App. at 606, 571 S.E.2d at 577.
Jones, 346 Ga. App. at 244, 816 S.E.2d at 111.
737 F. App’x 475 (11th Cir. 2018) (unpublished).
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arguably “played no role” in causing the collision.15 The driver of the
tractor-trailer drove through a red light and collided with another
vehicle, severely injuring the other driver and his passenger. The
injured driver then sued the tractor-trailer driver, his employer, and
Colonial Cartage Corporation (Colonial Cartage), the trailer owner.
Colonial Cartage was a named insured under a commercial umbrella
insurance policy issued by Great American Insurance Company (Great
American). The driver of the tractor-trailer was an employee of Moore
Freight, which also owned the tractor. Great American filed a
declaratory judgment action, contending that the trailer did not cause
the accident and that its umbrella coverage did not apply because the
driver and Moore Freight were not insureds under its policy. 16 The
underlying policy, from which Great American’s coverage obligation was
determined, extended “insured” to include not only the policyholder, but
also “[a]nyone . . . while using with [the policyholder’s] permission a
covered ‘auto’ [that the policyholder] own[s], hire[s] or borrow[s] . . . .”17
The underlying policy excluded the following from this definition: “[t]he
owner, or any ‘employee’, agent or driver of the owner, or anyone else
from whom [the policyholder] hire[s] or borrow[s] a covered ‘auto.’” 18
The Eleventh Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed the trial
court’s ruling against Great American, based on the decisions of other
courts, holding that accidents involving tractor-trailers are deemed to
have occurred from the use of both the tractor and the trailer as a
matter of law.19 The court rejected Great American’s argument that the
policy exclusion applied because Moore Freight owned the truck which
was “hired” or “borrowed” by the trailer owner.20 Instead, the court held
that, because nothing in the policy unambiguously excluded coverage in
this situation, the policy would be construed in favor of coverage. 21
Because the driver and his employer were “insureds” with respect to
their use of the trailer, the exception from coverage based on Moore
Freight’s ownership of the truck would not be applied where the
15. Id. at 477–78.
16. Id. at 476.
17. Id. at 477.
18. Id.
19. Id. (citing Blue Bird Body Co. v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 583 F.2d 717, 726 (5th
Cir. 1978) (“[N]early every jurisdiction to face the question has held that an accident
involving a tractor/trailer unit arises out of the use of both regardless of which part of the
unit was actually involved in the accident.” Id. at 726.)). No decision from a Georgia
appellate court was cited by the Eleventh Circuit and the court noted in Blue Bird Body
that the Georgia courts have not ruled on the issue. 583 F.2d at 727 n.8.
20. Great Am. Ins. Co., 737 F. App’x at 478.
21. Id.
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accident was deemed to have arisen from the use of the combined
tractor-trailer.22
III. LIABILITY INSURANCE CASES
A. Bad Faith and the Duty to Settle
In perhaps the most important and closely watched liability
insurance decision of this past year, the Georgia Supreme Court held
that an insurer’s duty to settle only arises when the injured party
presents a valid offer to settle within the insured’s policy limits. 23 First
Acceptance Insurance Company of Georgia, Inc. v. Hughes 24 began after
First Acceptance Insurance Company of Georgia, Inc.’s (First
Acceptance) insured caused an automobile accident that resulted in his
death, injuries to several others, and claims that exceeded the
minimum limits of his coverage.25 Counsel for one of those claimants
sent a letter to First Acceptance offering to settle his clients’ claims for
the “available policy limits” and expressing an interest in attending a
joint settlement conference with the other individuals injured in the
accident.26 Notably, that settlement letter did not contain any time limit
for First Acceptance to respond. When First Acceptance did not respond
after forty-one days, the claimants revoked their offer to settle and
proceeded with their lawsuit.27
After a DeKalb County jury awarded the claimants $5.3 million, the
administrator of the estate of First Acceptance’s insured filed suit
against the insurer, alleging First Acceptance was negligent and acted
in bad faith by failing to settle for the policy limit demand.28 Summary
judgment was granted to First Acceptance, but later reversed by the
Georgia Court of Appeals.29
In concluding First Acceptance was indeed entitled to summary
judgment, the Georgia Supreme Court focused specifically on the lack of
any time deadline presented in the letter demanding policy limits,
calling into question whether First Acceptance was even required to

22.
23.
(2019).
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
First Acceptance Ins. Co. of Ga. v. Hughes, 305 Ga. 489, 489, 826 S.E.2d 71, 73
Id. at 489, 826 S.E.2d at 71.
Id. at 490, 826 S.E.2d at 73.
Id. at 491, 826 S.E.2d at 73–74.
Id. at 491, 826 S.E.2d at 74.
Id.
Id. at 492, 826 S.E.2d at 74.
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respond within the thirty-day period alleged by the claimants. 30 The
court concluded it was not required to respond within that period of
time and that First Acceptance’s failure to do so was not bad faith. 31 As
a result, the supreme court concluded that First Acceptance was
entitled to summary judgment as the offer “was not a time-limited
settlement demand” and “First Acceptance was not put on notice that
its failure to accept the offer within any specific period would constitute
a refusal of that offer.”32 In the Hughes decision, the Georgia Supreme
Court expressly concluded as a matter of law that First Acceptance did
not act unreasonably in failing to accept the offer before it was
withdrawn by these claimants.33
B. Standard Release Deemed Counteroffer
In another decision involving an insurer’s handling of a settlement
offer, the Georgia Court of Appeals in Duenas v. Cook34 held that an
insurance company did not accept a settlement offer (that only bodily
injury claims would be released), and there was no enforceable
settlement agreement when the company required execution of a
standard release that was contrary to the terms of the settlement.35
Duenas was injured in an automobile–bicycle accident and sent a timelimited settlement offer to Nationwide, the insurer for the at-fault
driver. That time-limited demand expressly stated that only Duenas’
“personal injury/bodily injury claims” would be released.36 While
Nationwide agreed in writing to pay its policy limits, it also sent to
Duenas a “limited release” with its purported acceptance which
contained language that Duenas would release “any and all claims”
including property damage.37 The court noted that the “cover email
transmitting the release merely forwarded the documents and did not
indicate that it was a draft that could be revised to conform to the terms
of the Settlement Offer.”38 The court of appeals concluded this was a
30. Id. at 496, 826 S.E.2d at 77 (quoting Simpson & Harper v. Sanders & Jenkins,
130 Ga. 265, 271, 60 S.E. 541, 543 (1908) (if an offer “is silent as to the time given for
acceptance, the offer will be construed to remain open for a reasonable time.”)).
31. Id. at 497, 826 S.E.2d at 78.
32. Id. at 496, 826 S.E.2d at 77.
33. Id. at 490, 826 S.E.2d at 73.
34. 347 Ga. App. 436, 818 S.E.2d 629 (2018), reconsideration denied (Oct. 1,
2018), and cert. denied, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 368 (May 20, 2019).
35. Id. at 442, 818 S.E.2d at 634.
36. Id. at 437, 818 S.E.2d at 630–31.
37. Id. at 442, 818 S.E.2d at 633.
38. Id. at 442, 818 S.E.2d at 633–34 (citing Sherman v. Dickey, 322 Ga. App. 228,
231–32, 744 S.E.2d 408, 411 (2013)).
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counteroffer, as it imposed new conditions, namely requiring in the
proffered release that the property damage claim also be waived. 39 The
court concluded that Nationwide did not “unequivocally accept” the
demand and therefore there was no binding settlement.40
C. Publicly Funded Insurance Not Excess to Privately Funded Insurance
In response to a certified question, the Georgia Supreme Court
addressed competing “other insurance” clauses in two overlapping
policies covering the same loss.41 In National Casualty Co. v. Georgia
School Boards Association-Risk Management Fund,42 the Georgia
Supreme Court held that no law or public policy warranted coverage
provided by the Georgia School Boards Association-Risk Management
Fund (Risk Fund) to be excess to a commercial liability insurance
policy.43 The Risk Fund policy and the commercial policy issued by
National Casualty Company each contained “other insurance”
provisions with the intention of each being excess to any other
insurance.44 Following the precedent of State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.
v. Holton,45 where the Georgia Court of Appeals held that such
competing “other insurance” clauses are deemed “irreconcilable, cancel
each other out, and the liability is to be divided equally between
them,”46 the supreme court then inquired whether Georgia law or public
policy justified a departure from Holton, where a state fund paid by
taxpayers was involved.47 The supreme court concluded there was no
reason to depart from Holton, holding that there was “no apparent
public policy which would be furthered by [a] requirement that
commercial [] funds be exhausted before legislatively mandated public
funds” be used.48 Indeed, the supreme court stated that “the bedrock
public policy of freedom of contract would be frustrated” if such a
39. Id. at 442, 818 S.E.2d at 634.
40. Id.
41. Nat’l Cas. Co. v. Ga. Sch. Bds. Ass’n-Risk Mgmt. Fund, 304 Ga. 224, 228, 818
S.E.2d 250, 253 (2018).
42. Id. at 224, 818 S.E.2d at 250.
43. Id. at 231–32, 818 S.E.2d at 255–56. The Risk Management Fund, through the
Georgia School Boards Association, is an agency created by O.C.G.A. §§ 20-2-2001–
20-2-2002 (2019), and provided coverage for the Professional Association of Georgia
Educators. See National, 304 Ga. at 224–25, 818 S.E.2d at 251–52.
44. Id. at 225–26, 818 S.E.2d at 252.
45. 131 Ga. App. 247, 205 S.E.2d 872 (1974).
46. National, 304 Ga. at 228, 818 S.E.2d at 253 (quoting Holton, 131 Ga. App. at 248–
49, 205 S.E.2d at 872–73).
47. Id. at 229, 818 S.E.2d at 254.
48. Id. at 231, 818 S.E.2d at 255.
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requirement existed, and would render “meaningless the bargained-for
‘other insurance’ provisions contained” in the policies. 49
D. Notice of A Claim or Lawsuit
The Georgia Court of Appeals issued two separate decisions
reminding us of the obligations imposed on an insured to timely provide
notice of a claim or lawsuit to an insurance carrier. In Taylor v. State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,50 the Georgia Court of Appeals rejected the
arguments presented by a couple who claimed State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co. (State Farm) had constructive knowledge of the claims
against them by their homeowners’ association. 51 The Taylors sued
their neighborhood association after fines were imposed on them arising
over a dispute related to the ownership and return of community email
accounts. The association filed a counterclaim for breach of fiduciary
duties and other duties owed in conjunction with Alberta Taylor’s work
on a committee within the neighborhood. After discovering the
association maintained liability insurance with State Farm, the Taylors
sent a copy of the lawsuit they filed against the association to State
Farm, but made no reference to the counterclaims against them and did
not request coverage for those counterclaims under the State Farm
policy. Nearly eighteen months later, the Taylors sent another letter to
State Farm, this time claiming to be insureds under the policy issued to
the association, providing a copy of the counterclaim to State Farm for
the first time, and requesting coverage.52 State Farm denied coverage
based on the Taylors’ failure to meet the condition in the policy which
obligated them to inform State Farm of any lawsuit “as soon as
practicable.”53 The trial court granted summary judgment to State
Farm, and the Taylors appealed.54
The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment to State
Farm, concluding that “timely notice was a condition precedent to
coverage,” and that the first letter the Taylors sent to State Farm
“cannot be considered timely notice under the policy.” 55 Notably, the
court rejected the Taylors’ claim that “State Farm knew or should have
known” of the counterclaims against them since State Farm was
49. Id.
50. 347 Ga. App. 318, 819 S.E.2d 482 (2018).
51. Id. at 323, 819 S.E.2d at 485.
52. Id. at 319–21, 819 S.E.2d at 483–84.
53. Id. at 320–21, 819 S.E.2d at 484.
54. The trial court concluded the Taylors were insureds under the State Farm policy,
which was not contested on appeal. Id. at 321 n.2, 819 S.E.2d at 485 n.2.
55. Id. at 323–24, 819 S.E.2d at 485–86.
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defending the association, explaining that State Farm’s knowledge
would not relieve them of their “affirmative obligation under the policy
to provide notice of their claim and forward a copy of the counterclaims
to State Farm.”56
Similarly, in Johnson & Bryan, Inc. v. Utica Mutual Insurance
Company,57 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a trial court’s decision to
dismiss a broker’s lawsuit against Utica Mutual Insurance Co. (Utica),
its insurer, after it denied coverage and refused to defend the broker
following a seventy-two-day delay in providing a demand letter. 58 A
demand letter was sent to the broker alleging it failed to procure the
appropriate coverage for its clients and failed to provide them with a
copy of their policy. The broker received the demand letter in its
mailroom, but the demand letter was subsequently misplaced, never
promptly sent to Utica (which issued an errors and omissions policy to
the broker), and only discovered after a lawsuit was filed against the
broker.59 In affirming dismissal of the lawsuit against Utica, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded the broker’s “obligation to provide notice to
[Utica] was triggered by [the broker’s] receipt” of the letter, and the
seventy-two-day delay in providing notice to Utica violated the policy’s
“immediate notice requirement.”60 Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit
rejected the broker’s proffered justification for the delay—a mailroom
mistake—noting that if delay was due to the insured’s own negligence,
the delay was unreasonable as a matter of law. 61
E. Declaratory Relief Favored Over Intervention
Finally, in O’Brien v. Builders Insurance,62 the Georgia Court of
Appeals concluded an insurer cannot use intervention63 to litigate
potential coverage disputes, reminding carriers that the proper
procedural remedy was to initiate a declaratory judgment action.64
Builders Insurance (Builders) filed a motion to intervene in a lawsuit
between its insureds (a construction company and its owner) and
various plaintiffs, suing for defective construction, breach of contract,

56. Id. at 323, 819 S.E.2d at 485.
57. 741 Fed. App’x 722 (11th Cir. 2018).
58. Id. at 724–25.
59. Id. at 724.
60. Id. at 725.
61. Id. at 726.
62. 350 Ga. App. 77, 827 S.E.2d 917 (2019).
63. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-24(a)(2) and (b)(2) (2019), which provide grounds for
intervention of right and permissive intervention, respectively, upon a timely application.
64. O’Brien, 350 Ga. App. at 79, 827 S.E.2d at 918.
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and breach of warranty. The motion to intervene was filed three years
after the plaintiffs’ complaint was filed but was limited insofar as
Builders only sought to participate in discovery and propose a special
verdict form. The trial court granted Builders’s motion and the
plaintiffs filed an application for appeal, which was granted. 65 In
reversing the trial court’s order granting intervention, the court of
appeals noted that a party “may not intervene where he has a remedy
which may be asserted in a proper proceeding.”66 More importantly, the
court concluded that “a declaratory judgment action is a proper
proceeding for determining issues of insurance coverage,” and Builders
could “pursue its own independent [declaratory judgment] action” to
determine insurance coverage.67 Accordingly, the court concluded that
the trial court abused its discretion by authorizing Builders’s
intervention.68
IV. PROPERTY INSURANCE CASES
A. Offer to Sit for an EUO Does Not Cure a Breach
In Hutchinson v. Allstate Insurance Company,69 Hutchinson suffered
a fire loss on September 2, 2014. During Allstate Insurance Company’s
(Allstate) investigation, questions arose concerning Hutchinson’s
residency in the home. In order to evaluate this potential coverage
issue, Allstate demanded Hutchinson’s Examination Under Oath
(EUO). At the EUO, Hutchinson disputed statements in previous letters
from Allstate’s attorney regarding his responsiveness to Allstate’s
requests. Hutchinson said he would cooperate but only if Allstate
recanted the statements in the letters. Allstate refused. Allstate’s
attorney explained that Hutchinson’s refusal could result in a denial of
the claim. Allstate then began questioning Hutchinson about his
residency in the home. Hutchinson sat silently, refusing to answer the
questions. Nine days later, Allstate denied his claim on the grounds
that Hutchinson breached the policy by refusing to answer questions
during his EUO.70
Over a year after the denial, Hutchinson’s attorney sent a bad faith
demand letter to Allstate simultaneously offering for Hutchinson to
65. Id. at 77, 827 S.E.2d at 918.
66. Id. at 78, 827 S.E.2d at 918 (quoting Potter’s Properties, LLC v. VNS Corp., 306
Ga. App. 621, 623, 703 S.E.2d 79, 81 (2010)).
67. Id. at 79, 827 S.E.2d at 918–19.
68. Id. at 79, 827 S.E.2d at 919.
69. 741 F. App’x 680 (11th Cir. 2018) (unpublished).
70. Id. at 681–82.
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submit to another EUO. Allstate replied that it would reconvene the
EUO, subject to a reservation of all rights and defenses by Allstate. The
EUO never occurred. Hutchinson filed suit against Allstate, alleging
breach of contract and bad faith. The district court granted summary
judgment to Allstate and Hutchinson appealed. 71
On appeal, Hutchinson acknowledged that he was not legally excused
from complying with the policy conditions and that a refusal to submit
to the EUO was a breach of the policy. However, Hutchinson argued
that his offer to submit to the EUO created a jury question regarding
his compliance with the policy.72 The Eleventh Circuit disagreed.73
Relying upon its previous decision in Pervis v. State Farm Fire and
Casualty Company,74 the court concluded that a belated offer to submit
to the EUO did not cure the breach, quoting its previous holding that
“State Farm had no obligation to repeat its request for an examination
after appellant breached the contract . . . .”75
B. Judicial Estoppel
In Squires v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company,76 Plaintiffs
Kevin and Aleta Squires had a fire loss at their home in Canton.
Following the fire, the Squires submitted five different inventories and
proofs of loss to their insurance company, State Farm, for their personal
property loss. The documents asserted values for personal property
ranging from a little over $90,000 to almost $145,000. Two of the
inventories were submitted while the Squires had a Chapter 13
bankruptcy proceeding pending. The Squires valued their personal
property in the bankruptcy petition at only $2,925. 77
State Farm alleged that photos taken after the fire did not
substantiate the large quantity of items claimed.78 State Farm denied
the Squires’ claim on the grounds that they had misrepresented and
concealed material information. The Squires filed suit against State
Farm for breach of contract and bad faith.79
The district court held that the Squires were judicially estopped from
asserting a claim for more than the amount disclosed in their
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 682.
Id.
Id.
901 F.2d 944, 947 (11th Cir. 1990).
Hutchinson, 741 F. App’x at 682 (citing Pervis, 901 F.2d at 948).
No. 1:17-CV-2613-RWS, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31954 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 28, 2019).
Id. at *1–2.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *2–3.
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bankruptcy proceedings.80 The court determined that the inconsistency
“[made] a mockery of the judicial system” because it was calculated to
obtain unfair advantage.81 State Farm was therefore granted summary
judgment.82
Importantly, the district court applied the higher level of scrutiny
required by the Eleventh Circuit in Slater v. U.S. Steel.83 The district
court analyzed the “totality of [] circumstances” required by the court in
Slater, detailing how the Squires’ inconsistent disclosures were
indisputably “calculated to make a mockery of the judicial system.” 84 In
this connection, the court first noted that the Squires made inconsistent
statements regarding the reasons for discrepancy between the
bankruptcy and insurance claim disclosures. 85 During her examination
under oath, Ms. Squires said that the sworn disclosures in the
bankruptcy petition were made based upon the advice of counsel. Later,
at her deposition, she said that the bankruptcy disclosures included
only her business’s personal property since the bankruptcy was for her
business.86 Finally, in response to State Farm’s motion for summary
judgment, Ms. Squires argued that amounts asserted in the bankruptcy
petition were simply “thrift store values” for the same items claimed in
the fire.87 Under these circumstances, the court concluded that the
Squires made inconsistent sworn statements in the bankruptcy and the
insurance claim.88
Having concluded that there were inconsistent sworn statements, the
court then went on to analyze whether the inconsistencies were
calculated to make a mockery of the judicial system. 89 The factors that
the court considered included findings that the Squires were discharged
for approximately $34,000 in unsecured debt but never informed the
bankruptcy court that they submitted a claim for over $140,000 with
State Farm for their personal property.90 The Squires never amended
their bankruptcy petition to disclose their fire claim despite numerous
other amendments.91 The Squires had motive to conceal the personal
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at *10.
Id.
Id. at *11.
Id. at *9 (citing Slater v. U.S. Steel, 871 F.3d 1174 (11th Cir. 2017)).
Id.
Id. at *8–9.
Id. at *8.
Id.
Id. at *8–9.
Id. at *9.
Id.
Id. at *7.
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property assets. The Squires never corrected the inconsistency between
their insurance claim and their bankruptcy disclosures. The Squires
were educated, sophisticated parties. And the Squires took inconsistent
positions despite ample access to legal counsel. 92
Based upon these circumstances, the court concluded that the
Squires were estopped from claiming more than $2,925 in the claim
against State Farm.93 Because State Farm previously paid $4,000
before litigation ensued, State Farm had satisfied its obligations under
the policy.94 Further, because State Farm had reasonable grounds for
contesting the Squires’ claim, there could be no bad faith as a matter of
law.95
C. Policy Declarations Do Not Create Ambiguity
In Goldeagle Ventures, LLC. v. Covington Specialty Insurance
Company,96 a lightning storm damaged 103 halide lights that were
attached to a building owned by Goldeagle Ventures, LLC (Goldeagle).
The lights were attached to, but were not permanently installed in, the
building. Additionally, the lights had been purchased prior to
Goldeagle’s tenancy and had not been paid for by Goldeagle. 97
Goldeagle filed an insurance claim with its insurer, Covington
Specialty Insurance Company (Covington), and the claim was
subsequently denied. Goldeagle then filed suit against Covington and
sought summary judgment, asserting that the lights were covered
under Goldeagle’s insurance. Covington argued that the lights were not
covered. Covington prevailed.98 Goldeagle appealed.99
The principal argument asserted by Goldeagle was that the
Covington policy was ambiguous. 100 The policy stated Covington would
pay for loss or damage to Covered Property at the premises described in
the Declarations.101 In the policy itself, “Covered Property” could
include the “Building,” “Your Business Personal Property,” and
“Personal Property of Others,” but only if “a Limit of Insurance is

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *11.
349 Ga. App. 446, 825 S.E.2d 881 (2019).
Id. at 446–47, 825 S.E.2d at 883.
Id. at 448, 825 S.E.2d at 883–84.
Id. at 448, 825 S.E.2d at 884.
Id. at 450, 825 S.E.2d at 885.
Id. at 447, 825 S.E.2d at 883.
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shown in the Declarations for that type of property.”102 The
Declarations stated that “[i]nsurance at the described premises applies
only for coverage for which a limit of insurance is shown.”103 The only
limit of insurance shown in the Goldeagle Declarations was for
Business Personal Property. Goldeagle did not purchase or pay a
premium for the “Building” or for “Personal Property of Others.” 104
Nevertheless, because the standard form policy contained these other
coverages, Goldeagle apparently argued that the Declarations and the
policy created an ambiguity.105 The court rejected the argument, noting
that “insurers are ‘allowed to issue standard form policies, containing
multiple coverage provisions, even though not all coverages have been
purchased by an insured.’”106 Quoting at length from a previous decision
dealing with a similar contention, the court noted that the Declarations
provide a roadmap for the coverages purchased by the insured and
should be read together with, rather than separate from, the rest of the
policy:
[t]he Declarations Page represents the means by which an insurer
tailors its standard form policy to allow insureds to purchase only the
types of coverage, and the amount of such coverage, that they desire.
It “is the one part of the policy likely to be read by the insured, and
contains the terms most likely to have been requested by the
insured.” 16 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts, § 49:25 (4th
ed.); see also Zacarias v. Allstate Ins. Co., 168 N.J. 590, 775 A.2d
1262, 1270 (2001) (Because the declarations page is the “one page
most likely to be read and understood by the insured,” insurers
should “incorporate thereon as much information as may reasonably
be included.”). For that reason, the form policy must be read together
with the Declarations Page to determine exactly which coverages,
and in what amounts, an insured has purchased.107

Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded that the policy was not
ambiguous.108
Because Goldeagle only purchased coverage for its Business Personal
Property, the court then analyzed coverage under this provision. 109 To
102. Id. at 447–48, 825 S.E.2d at 883–84.
103. Id. at 450, 825 S.E.2d at 885.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 449, 825 S.E.2d at 885 (quoting Simalton v. AIU Ins. Co., 284 Ga. App. 152,
154, 643 S.E.2d 553, 555 (2007)).
107. Id. at 449, 825 S.E.2d at 884–85 (quoting Simalton, 284 Ga. App. at 154, 643
S.E.2d at 555).
108. Id. at 450, 825 S.E.2d at 885.
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be covered, the lights had to be “fixtures . . . (a) Made a part of the
building or structure . . . and (b) . . . acquired or made at [Goldeagle’s]
expense.”110 The court used an ordinary dictionary meaning of the term
“fixture” to conclude that the lights were not a permanently installed
part of the building.111 The court also determined that even if the lights
could be considered fixtures, the lights were not “acquired or made at
[Goldeagle’s] expense.”112
The court also rejected Goldeagle’s argument that the lights were
Business Personal Property because the lights were “leased personal
property for which [Goldeagle had] a contractual responsibility to
insure.”113 Goldeagle’s lease required Goldeagle to keep the premises in
good repair but did not explicitly require Goldeagle to insure the
lights.114 With respect to insurance, the lease only required that
Goldeagle purchase adequate coverage for Goldeagle’s “merchandise,
trade fixtures, furnishing, wall covering, floor covering, carpeting,
drapes, equipment[,] and all items of personal property of Tenant
located on or within the Premises.”115 Because the lease specifically
included “lighting” in the list of items Goldeagle was required to
maintain but excluded “lighting” from the list of assets Goldeagle was
required to insure, the lease demonstrated that a duty to maintain was
not equivalent to a duty to insure.116 For these reasons, the court
affirmed the trial court’s judgment in Covington’s favor.117
D. Zillow and qPublic.net Not Reliable Sources for Valued Policy
Dispute
In Hollingsworth v. LM Insurance Company,118 the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Georgia rejected a pro se
plaintiff’s attempt to rely upon online estimates of home values to
establish that her fire-damaged home had been “wholly destroyed”
under the Valued Policy Act.119 Hollingsworth’s home sustained damage

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 450–51, 825 S.E.2d at 885.
Id. at 451, 825 S.E.2d at 886.
Id.
Id. at 451–52, 825 S.E.2d at 886.
Id. at 452, 825 S.E.2d at 886.
Id.
Id.
No. 5:17-cv-00494-TES, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37419 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 8, 2019).
Id. at *18, *22; O.C.G.A. § 33-32-5(a) (2019).
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from a fire but it did not burn to the ground.120 Adjusters from her
insurance company, LM Insurance Company (LM), an engineer, and
several repair contractors consulted by the plaintiff all examined the
premises but none concluded that the home was wholly destroyed. 121
Repair estimates included LM’s estimate of about $232,000, an informal
verbal estimate from Paul Davis Restoration (PDR) of about $325,000,
and a written estimate from Sentry Construction Company (Sentry) for
about $366,000.122 The policy limit for the structure was $502,600. None
of the estimates concluded that the house was a total loss. 123
Hollingsworth sought the policy limits under Georgia’s Valued Policy
Act.124 Under Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company v.
Brown,125 Hollingsworth asserted that “it would cost more to repair her
house than to replace it and [that] photographs and other evidence
show[ed] that her home ha[d] been substantially gutted by the fire due
to the damage of structural components of the foundation . . . .”126 In
making these assertions, Plaintiff relied upon her own
“prior experience with remodeling historic homes in the area,” “a
diploma in Carpentry . . . which include[d] a certification in framing,”
real estate estimates from Zillow.com and Realtor.com, a tax
appraisal from qPublic.net, estimates of building costs from an
unnamed person from the Home Builders Association of Middle
Georgia, and photographs showing fire damage to her home.127

The court rejected Hollingsworth’s arguments because she failed to
submit any admissible evidence that the cost of repairing the home
exceeded the cost of replacement.128 Hollingsworth’s experience in
remodeling and her certification in framing lacked sufficient foundation
and methodology to qualify her as an expert under the Federal Rules of
Evidence.129 Her remarks, if admissible at all, would only be admissible
as lay opinion testimony.130 However, as a property owner, she would
only be permitted to provide her lay opinion regarding the value of her

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at *22.
Id. at *8, *15 n.12.
Id. at *8–9.
Id. at *12.
Id. at *9.
192 Ga. App. 504, 385 S.E.2d 87 (1989).
Hollingsworth, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37419, at *15–16.
Id. at *16.
Id. at *22.
Id. at *16 n.13.
Id.
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property.131 “Value” was irrelevant since, under Brown, proof of the cost
of new construction was needed.132
Additionally, Hollingsworth could not rely upon valuations from
Zillow, Realtor.com, and qPublic.net to establish replacement values
(that were less than the repair estimates) since the valuations were not
authenticated and were unreliable hearsay. 133 The court noted that
sites like Zillow.com and Realtor.com are “‘inherently unreliable’
because they are ‘participatory site[s]’ which allow homeowners ‘to
input or change specific entries,’ much like Wikipedia allows the
general public to edit its entries.”134 In addition, the information was
irrelevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 401 since the estimates
included the value of the land (“the dirt on which her house sits”)
“baked into” the prices given,135 rather than replacement construction
required by Brown.136
Hollingsworth also could not rely upon statements allegedly made by
an unknown “secretary” at the Home Builders Association of Middle
Georgia for the cost of new construction. 137 Such remarks were
inadmissible hearsay and were excluded since Hollingsworth made no
discernable argument that the unknown secretary was qualified to
provide replacement estimates.138
Furthermore, Hollingsworth’s photographs did not indicate that the
home was substantially gutted by fire because many of the photos
depicted rooms in the home “undergoing” a “cosmetic remodel” with no
fire damage, while only some showed “extensive fire damage” to a single
area (the “dining room area”).139 Further, “despite the clearly visible
char throughout some areas of [the] home, no one—aside from
[Hollingsworth]—[took] the position that the photographs show[ed]
‘substantial gut.’”140 The court noted that the home was still standing
and was supported by all pre-existing walls.141 Because the fire damage

131. Id. at *16 n.13 (citing United States ex rel. TVA v. An Easement & Right-Of-Way
over 6.09 Acres of Land, 140 F. Supp. 3d 1218, 1236–44 (N.D. Ala. 2015)).
132. Id.
133. Id. at *17.
134. Id. at *18 (citing In re DaRosa, 442 B.R. 173, 177 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2010)).
135. Id. at *18–19.
136. Id. at *13–14.
137. Id. at *20–21.
138. Id.
139. Id. at *21.
140. Id.
141. Id. at *22.
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was largely interior, no reasonable jury could find that the home was
wholly destroyed.142
Because Hollingsworth failed to submit any admissible evidence that
the cost of repairing the home exceeded the cost of replacing it entirely,
and because the photographs did not indicate that the house was
substantially gutted by fire, summary judgment was granted in LM’s
favor.143 The court also rejected Hollingsworth’s bad faith claim since it
was reasonable for LM to withhold payment of the policy limit pending
a decision under the Valued Policy Act. 144
E. Contractor May Testify on Diminished Value
The Georgia Court of Appeals considered whether excluding a
witness was an abuse of discretion where that witness was offered as an
expert or, alternatively, as a lay witness.145 In Woodrum v. Georgia
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company,146 William and Kathy
Woodrum’s home was damaged by a falling tree during a thunderstorm.
Months later, when the Woodrums and their insurer, Farm Bureau
Mutual Insurance Company (Farm Bureau), could not reach an
agreement on the amount of the loss, the Woodrums demanded
appraisal. Farm Bureau paid the appraisal award. 147
Still, the Woodrums filed suit against Farm Bureau alleging that the
house had diminished value (DV) because of the tree impact, that such
DV was not included in the appraisal award, and that Farm Bureau
failed to pay DV. In support of their claim, the Woodrums introduced an
affidavit from a contractor (Hall) who had repaired the Woodrums’
house and who opined that the value of the house was diminished due
to a crack in the slab foundation. In his deposition, Hall said that the
house lost 25% of its value due to the damage. Farm Bureau filed a
motion to exclude Hall’s testimony as both an expert and a lay witness
and also moved for summary judgment since Hall’s testimony was the
only basis for the DV claim. The trial court granted both motions. 148

142. Id. (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (“When opposing parties tell
two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no
reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for
purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”)).
143. Id. at *22–23.
144. Id. at *26.
145. Woodrum v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 347 Ga. App. 89, 89, 815 S.E.2d 650,
651 (2018).
146. Id. at 89, 815 S.E.2d at 651.
147. Id. at 89–90, 815 S.E.2d at 651–52.
148. Id. at 90, 815 S.E.2d at 652.
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The court agreed that Hall could be excluded as an expert on DV
because the Woodrums failed to show the methodology underlying
Hall’s testimony.149 Hall’s affidavit did not describe a methodology by
which he reached his conclusions and, at his deposition, the only basis
he provided for his valuation was his experience.150 Accordingly, the
court affirmed that part of the trial court’s order. 151
However, the court reversed the trial court’s exclusion of Hall as a
lay witness.152 Under the lay witness opinion rule, 153 a lay witness can
give opinion testimony as to market value “if he or she has had an
opportunity to form a reasoned opinion.”154 The court held that the
evidence “amply” demonstrated that Hall could form a reasoned opinion
as to the diminished value of the house based upon his experience and
familiarity with the Woodrum’s home.155 Accordingly, the court
concluded that Hall was qualified to give lay opinion testimony as to the
effect of the foundation damage on the value of the home and that the
trial court erred in excluding Hall’s testimony as a lay witness. 156
Notably, two of the judges on the panel concurred in the judgment
only, rendering the case physical precedent only under Court of Appeals
Rule 33.2(a).157

149. Id. at 91–92, 815 S.E.2d at 653.
150. Id. at 92, 815 S.E.2d at 653.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 94, 815 S.E.2d at 654.
153. See O.C.G.A. § 24-7-701(b) (2019).
154. Woodrum, 347 Ga. App. at 92, 815 S.E.2d at 653.
155. Id. (relying on Vitello v. Stott, 222 Ga. App. 134, 136, 473 S.E.2d 504, 505–06
(1996)).
156. Id. at 93, 815 S.E.2d at 654.
157. Id. at 95, 815 S.E.2d at 655; GA. APP. CT. R. 33.2(a).
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